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A series of protests took place in Turkey this summer following a dispute over the redevelopment of the
Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul. Burak Kadercan writes that one largely overlooked aspect to the
protests was the absence of Turkey’s military, which has traditionally played a strong role in Turkish
politics. Tracing the rise and fall of the military as a political actor in the country, he argues that
direct military intervention in politics is now no longer an option. Nevertheless, Turkey’s political
situation is so fluid that the possibility of a military resurgence cannot be ruled out long-term.
The summer of 2013 was a remarkable episode in the ever-unpredictable story of democratisation
in the Middle East, especially in the context of civil-military relations. Not surprisingly, the Egyptian
case has attracted much of the attention. As hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets to criticise
Mohammed Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party for its increasingly autocratic and “Islamic” posture, the Egyptian
military under General Sisi toppled the government, suspending the constitution. The subsequent protests by the
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were crushed violently by security forces, fuelling a series of tragic events
that claimed the lives of many. For lack of a better word, the future of Egyptian democracy looks bleak. And the
armed forces will most likely play a very important role in that future.
On the other hand, what did not happen in Turkey when
hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets
in June has attracted little attention. The military, the
pivotal actor in Turkish politics since 1960 with four
coups under its belt, was not there. Not at all. While
counterfactual reasoning – with its emphasis on “what
if” questions – is a tricky business in the presence of too
many variables, it can still provide an insight into the
extent of the military’s now-lost political prowess. What
would have happened if the Gezi Park protests broke
out in 2009, when the army was still considered a
potent political force? Suggesting that Turkey in 2009
would have looked like Egypt in 2013 would be a
stretch, for Turkey is not Egypt. Yet, it is difficult to make
the case that everything would have been the same.
The question then becomes, what happened to the
military?
The short answer is that as its political might grew, the
army’s mode of involvement in politics became too
sophisticated and too bureaucratised for its own sake, eventually rendering it too “cumbersome” a political actor to
keep up with the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) “agile” and pragmatic modus operandi. As tensions
between the army and the JDP were boiling by the end of the last decade, the latter was able to catch the former off-
guard and effectively pacify it by pushing forward cases such as Ergenekon and Balyoz (where numerous members
of the military were charged with crimes that ranged from conspiring against the elected government to outright
terrorism). At the same time, the JDP galvanised public support behind Prime Minister Erdoğan, who himself had
been a victim of the military’s overbearing political might in the past.
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Rough play: how the armed forces “quit” politics
Make no mistake. Few would complain about army’s exit from politics. However, considering the ‘rough play’
between the army and the JDP that eventually led to the arrests of dozens of generals, countless officers, and even
academics and journalists, few would defend the process of transformation for its fairness or smoothness. The trials
that dismantled the political prowess of the military are usually defended as a means to an end (further
democratisation), but rarely for their own sake.
There are many reasons for this ‘bad taste’ that the trials left
in the public consciousness. For one, there remain doubts
about the reliability of some of the evidence provided by the
prosecutors, one of the most notorious being digital Microsoft
Word files allegedly produced in 2003, but somehow written
by a font Microsoft only introduced in 2007. The fact that the
former Chief of Staff, Ilker Basbug, was condemned as the
leader of a “terrorist organisation” and sentenced to life most
certainly feels ‘wrong’ for many Turkish citizens. The rather
blanket treatment of the suspects as well as the excessively
long duration of the trials also raise questions about the scope
and depth of the collateral damage that the process might
have created.
In sum, the process through which the army quit the political
sphere was neither voluntary nor graceful. The ousting of the
military from politics did not follow from a series of
negotiations or a gradual democratisation effort where the
armed forces were phased out of politics smoothly. It was, in
the end, a counter-coup of sorts. The puzzle, then, runs even
deeper than it may first appear: how could the JDP defeat the military in a game – the game of rough power politics
– which the latter had excelled in since 1960?
Getting the story right: from colonel coups to “sophisticated intervention”
Turkish political discourse has long been dominated by the myth of “the” army, which is conceived of as an
immutable and static actor that intervened in politics via institutionalised and sophisticated means since the coup of
1960. For any informed student of Turkish political history, this is anachronistic at best. The army’s means of
intervention in politics as well as its decision mechanisms over such intervention have evolved tremendously over
time. It is in fact in this very institutional evolution where we can find the key to unlock the mystery surrounding the
rise and fall of the Turkish army as a political actor.
As with many issues in Turkish politics, the story of the army’s institutional evolution is complex, but it can be
summarised in five stages. The first stage was between 1923 and 1960, where the army had some latent power, but
neither the opportunity nor the motivation to intervene in politics. It is at this stage that the military internalised its
reason of being as the protector of the secular republic.
The coup of 1960 that eventually led to the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers
marked the coming of the second stage. The rationale for intervention was the increasingly autocratic and “Islamic”
policies and discourses pushed forward by the Menderes administration. However, the coup of 1960 was a far cry
from how it is usually presented in present-day political discourse: it was not a collective and top-down effort on the
part of the armed forces. It was truly a “colonels’ coup,” launched by mid-ranking officers not only against the
government, but also in open defiance of the chain of command. The coup literally smashed the bottle where the
military genie used to live. The early 1960s witnessed two more – failed – attempts at a colonel coup. More
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importantly, the army, while willing to go back to the barracks, proved unwilling to let go of its newfound pivotal
position in politics.
The third stage came with the coup of 1971. This time, the decision to intervene
came from the chain of command and the mode of intervention was much less
violent and dramatic, not to mention better-organised, than it had been in 1960. In
the face of political instability, the members of the General Staff simply handed a
memorandum to the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who eventually stepped
down. The top-down nature of the decision to intervene and the means of doing so
reflected the increasing institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of army’s
involvement in politics. However, the process was not entirely complete by 1971,
as there were serious disagreements among the members of the General Staff,
especially between the Air Force Commander and the Chief of Staff, who had
different ideas about the scope of the intervention as well as the position to be
taken afterwards.
“Who calls the shots” was no longer a question in the fourth chapter of our story.
When the military intervened again in 1980, this time with full force, in the face of domestic instability and a low-
intensity civil war between the radical left and ultranationalist right that was bleeding the country white, the decision
for intervention came directly from the Chief of Staff Kenan Evren (also the President between 1980 and 1989). It
was also expressed through a unified voice, suggesting that “to intervene or not to intervene” as well as “how to
intervene” was now an inextricable component of the decisions that have to go through the chain of command.
Intervening in politics, one can argue, was becoming one of the “regular” institutionalised and bureaucratised
functions of the army. Acting as a unitary political actor, the army during Evren’s reign (which can also be identified
as the fourth episode of our story) was instrumental in the substantial political and social engineering efforts that
followed the coup.  The army went back to the barracks once again, but only after further ossifying and
institutionalising its presence in the political sphere.
The fifth episode of the institutional evolution of the military is highlighted by the “post-modern” coup of 1997. The
rationale for intervention reflected concerns of 1960 much more so than 1971 and 1980: having been convinced that
Erdoğan’s once-mentor and predecessor Necmettin Erbakan, who was the Prime Minister of a coalition-government
at the time, had been trying to offset the country’s secular ways, the army passed a “memo” to the government,
“strongly” advising Erbakan to resign (of course, a display of tanks was involved). As sophisticated, nuanced, and
bloodless as this mode of intervention was, it left a scar on Turkish democracy, triggering a series of slow-motion
reactions from the masses that eventually empowered Erdoğan, who had spent four months in prison for reciting a
poem that was deemed “provocative” by the military, and his JDP at the expense of the more established political
parties.
In this fifth and final episode, the army’s involvement in politics became substantially sophisticated and
bureaucratised, which rendered the military not only a formidable force to be reckoned with, but also a “slow” and
predictable political actor. When JDP placed its bets on Ergenekon and Balyoz (to be sure, if the trials had backfired,
they might have triggered another coup), not everyone was sold on the idea that the Turkish army was willing to
blow up mosques and carry out strategic political assassinations just to create the kind of political instability that
would “invite” military intervention. Nevertheless, few also doubted the notion that the army might have devised
contingency plans based on the possibility that the JDP might – someday – slide into less secular and more
autocratic territory.
Regardless, the JDP acted swiftly and decisively by putting its weight behind the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials while
also galvanising public support for its cause. The military was too unprepared, isolated, and outpaced to match
JDP’s manoeuvres. Put simply, what made the army the most formidable force in politics eventually made it “slow,”
exposing it to a “counter-coup” from a politically agile actor.
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Road ahead: back to the future, or a brand new day?
The commanders of the 1997 coup proudly declared they initiated a
process that would last for a thousand years. Delivering such
bombastic statements while holding unmatched power is one of the
constants of the Turkish political discourse. Yet another constant is that
the political discourse itself adjusts quite rapidly and effortlessly.
Considered as inextricably tied to the fate of Turkish democracy only a
few years ago, ‘what will the military say?’ is no longer an interesting or
relevant question in everyday politics.
The JDP made sure to decisively dismantle the very institutional and
bureaucratic mechanisms that the army had developed over decades
in order to stay involved in politics. This is good news for Turkish
democracy. Yet, the ‘rough’ dismantling of the military’s top-down and
institutionalised involvement also created a residual risk, especially in
the context of the long-running tensions within Turkish society that
revealed themselves during the Gezi Park protests.
Just as a 1990s-style military intervention has become practically impossible, a 1960-style colonels’ coup is more
likely now than it was a decade ago, for the decision to intervene in politics is, once again, utterly decentralised.
Such an outcome is highly unlikely, yet not impossible. The Turkish political landscape is a shifting terrain that more
often than not compels the informed commentator to retreat to a well-known phrase: never say never.
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